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I. Introduction  
 
The Covid-19 pandemic has raised questions of international responsibility of States; in 
particular, whether States can be internationally responsible for the failure to prevent and 
the spread of the outbreak internally and externally across international borders;1 and other 
matters pertaining to international health law.2 Also, as highlighted in earlier contributions 
in this publication, the Covid-19 pandemic raises tensions and questions in domestic and 
international law. These draw to light questions of State responsibility for acts  or 
omissions  by States for various conduct that may come into question. This is particularly 
so when States are unable to perform obligations owed under international law to other 
States, international organizations or individuals, as a result of their domestic policies and 
actions to deal with the Covid-19 pandemic.  
 
This contribution provides an overview of the rules of international law concerning the 
responsibility of States for their international wrongful acts, and how these rules are 
relevant in the Covid-19 pandemic. The international law of State responsibility, as 
formulated by the International Law Commission in the 2001 Articles on the responsibility 
3 depicts the general 
conditions under international law for a State to be responsible for wrongful acts and the 
legal consequences that flow by operation of law. These general conditions are understood 
as the secondary rules of State responsibility, which result from the breach of primary rules, 
i.e. rules of customary international law or treaty law that provide international obligations 
on States.  
 
With regard to primary rules, States have very different obligations under various 
international legal frameworks which play an especially significant role during the 
pandemic, e.g., international health law; international human rights law; international 
refugee law; international investment law; international trade law; international 
environmental law and  international water law. Thus, this contribution does not look at the 
primary rules, of which there are many under the aforementioned legal frameworks, and 
some have been examined in detail elsewhere in this publication; but rather focuses on 
the secondary rules under international law that apply when a State has acted in breach 
of any obligation arising from one or more of these primary rules.  
 
 
 
 
1 Article 2, International Health Regulations 2005.  
2 Pedro A. Villarreal, -
International Health Regulations in Light of Covid- vailable at: 
http://opiniojuris.org/2020/03/31/covid-19-symposium-can-they-really-do-that-states-obligations-under-the-
international-health-regulations-in-light-of-covid-19-part-i/. 
3 ILC, Articles on the Responsibility of State
 April-1 June and 2 July-10 August 2001)  UN Doc 
A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 [2001 ILC Articles]. 
This contribution will be structured as follows:  
 
(i) the general principles of State responsibility that govern the concept of an internationally 
wrongful act of a State will be explained. Within this analytical framework, the complexities 
of various factual situations that pertain to the Covid-19 pandemic will be drawn out. As 
will be elaborated upon, the attribution of conduct to a State and the finding of a breach of 
an international obligation cannot be established in the abstract, but needs to be 
characterised on the basis of factual situations that arise.  
 
(ii) Due to the unprecedented and extraordinary nature of the Covid-19 pandemic, it is 
relevant to examine whether States may rely on circumstances precluding wrongfulness 
as a defence so to speak for not complying with their international obligations in times of 
the Covid-19 pandemic. Three grounds appear plausible: force majeure, distress and 
necessity. 
 
(iii) In the event that there is a breach of an international obligation, plausible  or not so 
plausible - inter-State claims may arise. In light of these developments, the content (or 
substance) of State responsibility will be discussed from the premise that international 
responsibility flows from the breach of the international obligation and that a new legal 
relationship arises from the internationally wrongful act. The legal consequences of an 
internationally wrongful act give rise to an obligation on the responsible State to cease the 
wrongful conduct, and make full reparation for the injury caused by the international 
wrongful act.  
 
(iv) Lastly, the practical aspects of the invocation of the responsibility of a state will be 
explained in the context of who is entitled to bring a claim. Ultimately, as will be shown, 
forms of invocation vary, and will depend on the circumstances surrounding the 
internationally wrongful conduct and available fora.    
   
Before engaging in the present inquiry, a point of clarification must be made from the outset 
that the international law of State responsibility provides default rules for determining the 
existence and consequences of internationally wrongful acts. These rules are expressed 
in customary law so are applicable generally, whether or not the particular instrument 
refers to them, but are also mostly dispositive, so can be suspended by lex specialis 
(special or more precise law) in particular instruments and institutions.4 For example, the 
implementation, by substituting countermeasures with treaty-based suspension of 
concessions; and partly replaces rules on reparation, by removing the possibility to claim 
compensation. In some international tribunals, issues governed by the law of State 
responsibility will be articulated in a substantially similar manner but without relying on their 
technical terminology; the treatment of rules on attribution in some of the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights is one example.5 In short, State responsibility has 
potentially very broad coverage but may sometimes be under-appreciated by specialists 
in particular fields of international law, either because of lex specialis or the development 
of specialist terminology.  
4 Article 55, 2001 ILC Articles, ibid. See also, Bruno Simma and Dirk Pulkowski, 'Of Planets and the 
Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in International Law,' (2006) 17(3) Eur J Intl L 483. 
5 James Crawford and Amelia Keene, 'The Structure of State Responsibility under the European 
Convention on Human Rights,' in Anne van Aaken and Iulia Motoc (eds) The European Convention on 
Human Rights and General International Law:, Online Journal (Oxford University Press, 2018) 178. 
 
II. The Internationally Wrongful Act of a State  
 
Every internationally wrongful act of a State 
entails the international respons
law of State responsibility, for which the remainder of the 2001 ILC Articles follows from.6  
Thus, in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, every internationally wrongful act of a State 
would entail international responsibility.   
 
Perhaps the most obvious point of departure when discussing State responsibility and the 
Covid-19 pandemic, without apportioning blame,7 would be questioning whether  State(s) 
could be held internationally responsible for not preventing the spread of the virus outbreak 
internally or externally beyond their borders.8 To adopt a black-letter analytical framework 
premised on the 2001 ILC Articles, the inquiry would need to formulate the aforementioned 
conduct of a State as an internationally wrongful act. Accordingly, Article 2 of the ILC 
Articles stipulates:  
 
There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or omission:  
 
(a) is attributable to the State under international law; and 
 
(b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.  
  
Thus, on a general level, conduct in relation to not preventing,9 protecting against, 
controlling,10 the spread of the virus internally or externally would have to be identified in 
question.11  
6 ILC Commentary to Article 1, Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
with commentaries 2001, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two 
 32. 
7 See Commentary to Article 2, ILC Commentary. 
8 -19 Coronavirus: are the International Health Regulations fit 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-outbreak-of-covid-19-coronavirus-
are-the-international-health-regulations-fit-for-purpose/
 2020, available at 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/justified-border-closures-do-not-violate-the-international-health-regulations-2005/. 
9 See the three Part entry by Antonio Coco and Talita de Souza Dias on due diligence and Covid-19: Part I: 
Due Diligence and COVID-
2020, available at: https://www.ejiltalk.org/part-i-due-diligence-and-covid-19-states-duties-to-prevent-and-
halt-the-coronavirus-outbreak/; Part II: Due Diligence and COVID-
the Coronavirus Outbreak; 25 March 2020, available at:  
https://www.ejiltalk.org/part-ii-due-diligence-and-covid-19-states-duties-to-prevent-and-halt-the-
coronavirus-outbreak/; Part III: Due diligence and COVID-
Coronavirus outbreak, 25 March 2020, available at: https://www.ejiltalk.org/part-iii-due-diligence-and-covid-
19-states-duties-to-prevent-and-halt-the-coronavirus-outbreak/. See also, their co-authored paper in this 
publication.    
10 Article 2, International Health Regulations (2005).  
11  In the Corfu Channel case, the Court observed that the laying of the minefield which caused the 
 consisted in notifying, for the benefit of shipping in 
general, the existence of a minefield in Albanian territorial waters and in warning the approaching British 
neither notified the existence of the minefield, nor warned the British warships of the imminent danger and 
th, 
  
A point can be made here about the aforementioned general principles of State 
responsibility in relation to the determination of an international wrongful act of a State: 
that the meaning and content of these secondary rules cannot be interpreted in their 
abstract, but rather the inquiry shifts towards the application of these rules, i.e. whether a 
particular set of facts can amount to conduct that is an act or omission attributable to the 
State and that would constitute a breach of an international obligation.   
 
As mentioned in my introduction, different primary rules under various legal frameworks 
under international law govern different conduct. Thus, it is likely that different obligations 
are called into question and when determining whether there is a breach of an international 
obligation, the principal focus should be on the primary obligation concerned. Pursuant to 
act of that State is not in conformity with what is required of it by that obligation, regardless 
of its origin or 
between treaty law or customary international law and is not concerned with the origin of 
the obligation breached.  
 
Drawing upon a more specific context, allegations have been made that China has acted 
in breach of obligations under the International Health Regulations (2005), an 
internationally binding agreement between 196 countries including all members of the 
World Health Organization (WHO); particularly Article 6 (notification) and Article 7 
(information-sharing during unexpected or unusual public health events).12 Not wanting to 
comment here on the validity of these allegations, the point I wish to elucidate is that these 
are specific obligations which speak to obligations to notify and share information 
respectively. These primary rules differ from other primary rules that may also be 
applicable in the context of conduct to not prevent the spread of the virus outbreak 
internally or externally, e.g. the no-harm rule in a transboundary context and the 
concomitant obligation of due diligence that stems from this primary rule;13 or obligations 
in relation to conditions of detention;14 or port denials and restrictions.15 Thus, the point is 
that State responsibility for acts or omissions that amount to conduct that did not prevent 
or contain the virus outbreak need to be determined on a rule by rule basis in accordance 
1949: ICJ Reports 1949, p.4, at p.22 and 23. Also, in the Consular Staff in Tehran case, the Court held that 
the Iranian Government failed altogether to take any "appropriate steps" to protect the premises, staff and 
archives of the United States' mission against attack by the militants, and to take any steps either to 
prevent this attack or to stop it before it reached its completion. They also show that on 5 November 1979 
the Iranian Government similarly failed to take appropriate steps for the protection of the United States 
Consulates at Tabriz and Shiraz. In addition they show, in the opinion of the Court, that the failure of the 
Iranian Government to take such steps was due to more than mere negligence or lack of appropriate 
plomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1980, p.3, at 
para.63.  
12 See -
available at:  https://www.ejiltalk.org/taking-china-to-the-international-court-of-justice-over-covid-19/. 
13 
earlier contribution by Antonio Coco and Talita de Souza Dias in this publication 
 
14 
 
15 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/port-denials-and-restrictions-in-times-of-
pandemic-did-international-law-lose-its-north/. 
to whether the conduct is attributable to the State under international law and constitutes 
a breach of the obligation arising from the primary rule in question.   
 
Another aspect which merits further consideration pertains to the internal measures and 
restrictions in relation to responding to the Covid-19 pandemic, i.e. broadly speaking, 
lockdowns which entail severe restrictions of movement and retail trade. Indeed, 
16 but in any 
event, Article 3 is of the 2001 ILC Articles is clear that when determining a breach of an 
international obligat
17 Thus, if the conduct in question 
is lawful under domestic law, this does not affect the characterisation under international 
law that the act is internationally unlawful.18 However, what may affect the characterisation 
is the nature of the primary rule itself as some primary rules have restrictions or 
derogations,19 e.g. Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights.20 Thus, when determining 
whether there is a breach of an international obligation the principal focus should be on 
the content of the primary obligation concerned. 
 
Whilst continuing down the inquiry pertaining to internal measures imposed by States in 
dealing with the Covid-19 pandemic, it may be of particular interest to think about the 
structural and capacity-building measures,21 and strategies of States in providing a public 
health response to Covid-19,22 and also the standards and decisions of States within the 
sphere of domestic health law.23 Obviously, infrastructure for capacity-building, as well as 
healthcare systems differ in every State, and whether States commit an internationally 
wrongful act in this regard is dependent on the primary rule in question which applies. 
Here, the Commentary to Article 2 of the 2001 ILC Articles may be helpful that there is no 
general rule pertaining to standards for breach of an obligation: 
 
whether they involve some degree of fault, culpability or want of due diligence. Such standards vary 
from one context to another for reasons which essentially relate to the object and purpose of the 
treaty provision or other rule giving rise to the primary obligation. Nor do the articles lay down any 
16 See 
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2020/04/01/jeff-king-the-lockdown-is-lawful/
lable at: https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2020/04/02/jeff-king-the-lockdown-is-lawful-part-
ii/. 
17 Article 3, 2001 ILC Articles (n. 3).  
18 Ibid.  
19 See, Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29: Article 4: Derogations during a State of 
Emergency, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, 31 August 2001. 
20 See -19 comply 
rch 2020, https://www.ejiltalk.org/do-the-containment-measures-taken-by-
italy-in-relation-to-covid-19-comply-with-human-rights-law/; Mariel Morales Antoniazzi and Silvia Steininger, 
-American Human Rights 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/how-to-protect-human-rights-in-times-of-
corona-lessons-from-the-inter-american-human-rights-system/. 
21 he International Health Regulations Put to the Test 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/are-you-ready-
for-a-pandemic-the-international-health-regulations-put-to-the-test-of-their-core-capacity-requirements/. 
22 -  
https://www.ejiltalk.org/contact-tracing-apps-and-human-rights/.  
23 For example, see the earlier contribution by Sabine Michalowski 
 
presumption in this regard as between the possible standards. Establishing there is a matter for the 
interpretation and application of the primary rules engaged in the given case.24    
      
 III. Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness  
 
Under the law of State responsibility, there are circumstances that a State may plead to 
preclude the wrongfulness of conduct that would otherwise be a breach of the international 
obligations of the State concerned.25 In a manner of speaking, this would provide a 
g to the ILC 
justification or excuse for non- 26 
Three circumstances have been identified as being potentially relevant:27 force majeure, 
distress and necessity. Before examining each respective circumstance in more detail, 
three points can be made from the outset. First, whether or not a circumstance precluding 
wrongfulness may apply, is dependent on the nature of the primary rule, e.g. some 
obligations under human rights treaties which are subject to derogations may exclude the 
plea of necessity. Second, the ILC had drafted these circumstances to have a high 
threshold in the sense that it would not be easy for States to rely on them to preclude 
wrongfulness for conduct which would ordinarily be in breach of an international obligation. 
Third, the relevance or appropriateness of these circumstances would depend on each 
State for the particular obligation concerned. There i
apply to all States for all the breach of all international obligations during the Covid-19 
pandemic.  
 
With regard to force majeure, Article 23 stipulates:  
 
1. The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international obligation of that 
State is precluded if the act is due to force majeure, that is the occurrence of an irresistible force or 
of an unforeseen event, beyond the control of the State, making it materially impossible in the 
circumstances to perform the obligation.  
 
2. Paragraph 1 does not apply if: (a) the situation of force majeure is due, either alone or in 
combination with other factors, to the conduct of the State invoking it; or (b) the State has assumed 
the risk of that situation occurring.28  
 
It would appear that force majeure strikes at the capacity for States to do something, i.e. 
obligation. States who are unable to comply with their international obligations during the 
Covid-19 pandemic would have to prove the material impossibility of performance. Further, 
24 Commentary to Article 2, ILC Commentary (n. 6), p.35.  
25 Nothing in this chapter precludes the wrongfulness of any act of a State 
 
26 Commentary to Chapter V, ILC Commentary (n. 6), p. 71. 
27 -
17 March 2020, available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/covid-19-and-defences-in-the-law-of-state-
responsibility-part-i/. 
28 Paddeu and Jephcott have identified five criteria for a successful claim for force majeure: A successful 
claim of force majeure must fulfill 5 conditions: (i) there must be an unforeseen event or an irresistible force 
 State must not have contributed to the 
situation; and (v) the State must not have assumed the risk of the situation occurring. Each of these will be 
assessed in turn, except for (v) which is likely to depend on the specific language of particular treaty 
commitments. Ibid. 
according to the ILC Commentary to Article 23, force majeure differs from a situation of 
e State involved which would otherwise be 
29 It is 
likely that the failure of performance by a State of an international obligation as a result of 
restrictive measures or a nation-wide lockdown is not involuntary.  
 
Distress under Article 24 stipulates:  
 
1. The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international obligation of that 
State is precluded if the author of the act in question has no other reasonable way, in a situation of 
 
 
2. Paragraph 1 does not apply if: (a) the situation of distress is due, either alone or in combination 
with other factors, to the conduct of the State invoking it; or (b) the act in question is likely to create 
a comparable or greater peril.30  
 
agent has acted to save his or her own life or where there exists a special relationship 
between the state organ or agent and the persons in danger. It does not extend to more 
31  It is 
difficult to imagine how States would be able to establish there is a special relationship 
between the State organ or agent that committed the breach of an international obligation 
and persons in danger (presumably the entire human population within the State).  
  
This brings the analysis to Article 25:  
 
1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act 
not in conformity with an international obligation of that State unless the act:  
 
(a) is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent 
peril;  
and (b) does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards which the 
obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole.  
 
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding wrongfulness if:  
(a) the international obligation in question excludes the possibility of invoking necessity; or (b) the 
State has contributed to the situation of necessity.32  
 
those exceptional cases where the only way a State can safeguard an essential interest 
threatened by a grave and imminent peril is, for the time being, not to perform some other 
29 Commentary to Article 23, ILC Commentary (n. 6), p.76.  
30 Paddeu and Jephcott suggest the following criteria for a successful claim of distress: the State would 
need to prove that: (i) threat to life; (ii) a special relationship between the State organ and the persons in 
question; (iii) that there was no other reasonable way to deal with the threat; (iv) that it did not contribute to 
 d-
19 and 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/covid-19-and-defences-in-the-law-of-state-responsibility-part-ii/. 
31 Commentary to Article 24, ILC Commentary (n. 6), p. 80. 
32 Paddeu and Jephcott (n. 30) suggest the following criteria for a successful claim of necessity: the State 
would need to prove that: (i) threat to life; (ii) a special relationship between the State organ and the 
persons in question; (iii) that there was no other reasonable way to deal with the threat; (iv) that it did not 
contribute to the situation; and (v) that the measures were proportionate.  
33 arises 
where there is an irreconcilable conflict between an essential interest on the one hand and 
an obligation of the State invoking necessity on the other. These special features mean 
that necessity will only rarely be available to excuse non-performance of an obligation and 
34 States wishing 
to rely on the plea of necessity would thus have to prove that the obligation in breach was 
irreconcilably incompatible with an essential interest. This is likely to be very difficult, as 
intended by the drafters.  
 
In a similar vein to the preceding analysis, whether a State can make a successful plea of 
force majeure, distress or necessity needs to be determined in accordance with whether a 
particular set of facts that arise from the circumstances surrounding the primary rule can 
fit into the content of the respective secondary rules of State responsibility.    
 
IV. Content of International Responsibility  
 
Upon the finding of an internationally wrongful act by a State  the next point of inquiry, 
which may find increasing relevance in the Covid-19 pandemic landscape, is one of legal 
consequences under the regime of State responsibility.35 Indeed, under the black-letter 
nomenclature of the 2001 ILC Articles, the content (or substance) of international 
responsibility is the new legal relationship that arises upon the commission by a State of 
an internationally wrongful act. State responsibility also extends towards breaches of 
international law where the primary beneficiary of the obligation breached is an individual 
or an entity other than a State.36 There is also a plurality aspect to the content of State 
obligations of the responsible State 
set out in this Part may be owed to another State, to several States, or to the international 
community as a whole, depending in particular on the character and content of the 
  
 
Although there may be an inclination to understand reparations for an internationally 
wrongful act as entitlement for damages from the injured State (or individual or other entity) 
for the wrongful conduct,37 the regime of State responsibility situates legal consequences 
as obligations that arise from the breach of an international obligation. Stemming from the 
breach of an international obligation, the core legal consequences under the regime of 
State responsibility are the obligations of the responsible State to cease the wrongful 
conduct (Article 30) and to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally 
wrongful act (Article 31). It should be emphasised that these are new obligations that stem 
by operation of law from the breach of an international obligation; and thus reparations are 
not an entitlement by the injured State, individual or entity but rather an obligation from the 
wrongdoing State to make full reparation.  
 
33 Commentary to Article 25, ILC Commentary (n. 6), p. 80. 
34 Ibid. 
35 This is not to say that a State may not face legal consequences of conduct which is internationally 
wrongful outside of State responsibility, e.g. under the law of treaties framework. See ILC Commentary (n. 
6), p.86.  
36 Article 33, 2001 ILC Articles (n. 3).  
37  H -19 and suggests US 
The Guardian
 The Guardian, 28 April 2020. 
The forms of reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act can take 
38 
s not call for reparation of any and all consequences 
39  
 
In the similar vein as the foregoing analysis on general principles of State responsibility, 
the content and form of reparation for internationally wrongful conduct during the Covid-19 
pandemic would need to be brought out to light through the international process of claims 
by States depending on the availability of fora.  
 
V. Implementation  
 
The inquiry now takes on a more practical consideration, i.e. the implementation of State 
responsibility. This refers to how the obligations to make reparations towards a beneficiary 
of the obligation can be invoked under international law; and who is entitled to claim. The 
most obvious starting point is that an injured State is entitled pursuant to Article 41 of the 
2001 ILC Articles to invoke the responsibility of another State if: (a) the obligation breached 
is owed to that State individually; or (b) a group of States including that State, or the 
international community as a whole; and the breach of the obligation: (i) specially affects 
that State; or (ii) is of such a character as radically to change the position of all the other 
States to which the obligation is owed with respect to the further performance of the 
obligation. According to the ILC Commentary to Article 42, invocation should be 
 character for example, the raising or 
presentation of a claim against another State or the commencement of proceedings before 
40  
 
he 
the commission of an internationally wrongful act by a State, in practice it is necessary for 
an injured State and/or other interested State(s) to respond, if they wish to seek cessation 
or reparation. Responses can take a variety of forms, from an unofficial and confidential 
reminder of the need to fulfil the obligati 41 
Obviously in practice, invocation would take different forms depending on the States 
involved and the availability of fora.   
 
A final note is that in the event that the breach of the international obligation has an erga 
omnes character,42 Article 48(1) allows a State other than an injured State to invoke 
responsibility if: (a) the obligation breached is owed to a group of States including that 
State, and is established for the protection of a collective interest of the group; or (b) the 
obligation breached is owed to the international community as a whole. According to Article 
38 Article 34, 2001 ILC Articles (n. 3).  
39 -19 Symposium: COVID- 1 
March 2020, available at http://opiniojuris.org/2020/03/31/covid-19-symposium-covid-19-and-the-
foundations-of-international-law/.  
40 Commentary to Article 42, ILC Commentary (n. 6), p.117. 
41 Commentary to Article 43, ILC Commentary (n. 6), p.119. 
42 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 3, paras.33-
34. 
48(2), a State other than an injured State that is entitled to invoke responsibility may claim 
from the responsible State: (a) cessation of the internationally wrongful act, and 
assurances and guarantees of non-repetition in accordance with article 30; and (b) 
performance of the obligation of reparation in accordance with the preceding articles, in 
the interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached.43 Notably, 
the invocation of responsibility pertains to the obligation of reparation to the injured State 
and the beneficiaries of the obligation breached and not to the State making the claim.  
  
Suffice to say, these practical steps with regard to invoking the content of responsibility for 
wrongful conduct committed during the Covid-19 pandemic, i.e. obligations of the 
responsible State to make full reparations depend on many other factors such as the 
particular set of facts and circumstances, availability of fora and evidence pertaining to the 
breach of the international obligation.   
 
VI. Conclusion  
 
This contribution has provided an overview to how the secondary rules of State 
responsibility apply to internationally wrongful acts by States during the Covid-19 
pandemic. I have pointed out that the determination of an internationally wrongful act, i.e. 
the attribution of conduct to a State and the finding of a breach of an international obligation 
is entirely premised on the nature of the underlying primary rule. I have also pointed out 
how the Covid-19 puts forward complex factual situations  of which  there is no simple 
cut and paste approach of applying the black-letter rules of State responsibility, but rather 
the inquiry pins on which set of facts and circumstances may amount to a finding of an 
internationally wrongful act. Likewise, the legal consequences that flow from operation of 
law for the breach of an international obligation, i.e. forms of reparations, depend on the 
nature of the primary rule which is breached and the circumstances surrounding the 
wrongful act; and remain to be seen depending on the availability of judicial process. Be 
that as it may, it is important to understand that entitlement to a claim is not an entitlement 
of damages as such, but rather an entitlement to invoke the responsibility of a wrongdoing 
State, to fulfil its obligations to cease the wrongful conduct (Article 30) and to make full 
reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act (Article 31). A legal 
relationship arises between a wrongdoing State and an injured State (or other beneficiaries 
of the obligation) which entitles the latter to invoke the international responsibility of the 
former. Ultimately, claims whether plausible or not so plausible will depend on the primary 
rule that has been breached. In light of the factual complexity of the Covid-19 pandemic, 
and the plethora of primary rules of international law that apply to States, it is likely that 
new and interesting questions of State responsibility will arise during the international 
process of the application of the black-letter rules in claims to come.   
  
43 See Commentary to Article 48, ILC Commentary (n. 6), p.126-128.  
